THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION:
POTENTIAL BIAS, HOLD-UP, AND THE NEED
FOR REFORM
WILLIAM DOLAN 1

ABSTRACT
The International Trade Commission (ITC) is an alternate
venue for holders of U.S. patents to pursue litigation against
infringing products produced abroad and imported to the United
States. Because the ITC may only grant injunctive relief, it has
awarded injunctions in situations where there may have been better
and more efficient remedies to the infringement available through
litigation in federal district court. The increased likelihood of
injunctive relief bolsters the position of patent holders against a
wide range of producers in royalty negotiations and can harm the
end consumers through a process known as “patent hold-up.”
There are currently sweeping and aggressive proposed reforms to
reduce this harm to consumers. This iBrief suggests that the
optimal reforms would not change the overall structure or scope of
the ITC or its jurisdiction. Rather it would harmonize the
substantive law, available defenses for respondents, and
requirements for injunctive relief between ITC proceedings and
litigation in federal district court.

INTRODUCTION
Created in 1916 by Congress as the United States Tariff
Commission, the now-named International Trade Commission (ITC) is an
independent administrative agency charged with the mission to “(1)
administer U.S. trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective
manner; (2) provide the President, Office of the United States Trade
Representative, and Congress with independent analysis, information, and
support on matters of tariffs, international trade and U.S. competitiveness;
and (3) maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.” 2
During the early years of its existence, the ITC’s duty was limited to
investigating allegations of unfair competitive practices abroad that were
harming domestic businesses and consumers. It was primarily concerned
¶1
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with investigating allegations of foreign dumping practices and other unfair
economic practices. However, the role of the ITC expanded significantly in
1930 with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (The Act). 3 Section
337 of this Act (Section 337) granted authority to the ITC to review
complaints about the importation of foreign goods that infringe on domestic
patents and to issue injunctive relief in the event the ITC found
infringement. 4 As more of the consumer goods purchased within the United
States are manufactured abroad—even those by domestically owned
companies—the scope of the ITC’s patent jurisdiction is ever increasing.
¶2
When a complaint is brought before the ITC, the Commission
initiates an investigation to determine whether or not the allegations are
valid; if so, the case allowed to progress. 5 Once the investigation
progresses into the adversarial phase, the complainant and respondent argue
their case before an administrative law judge who then makes an initial
determination. 6 This determination is then reviewed by the Commission,
which makes a final determination before submitting its recommendations
to the President for review. 7 The Commission’s decision can be appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 8 Because the ITC is an
administrative agency and not a court of law, neither the decision of the
Commission nor that of the Federal Circuit has the effect of res judicata on
a district court, 9 leading to the possibility of conflicting results in the same
dispute. Although the determination of the ITC is not binding on later
district court decisions, there are some advantages—such as the rapid
resolution of the investigation and limited durations for discovery—which
make the ITC an increasingly attractive venue for patent holders.

Through the passage of the Act, Congress effectively created a
venue parallel to the federal courts through which a domestic patent holder
can seek redress for infringing products produced abroad. As one
researcher found, sixty-five percent of the Section 337 cases before the ITC
¶3
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in the study were also litigated in federal district court. 10 Although the ITC
is not a court of law, and almost any remedy available to a domestic patent
holder is also available through the federal courts, there are some
advantages to the patent holder who brings a complaint before the ITC. The
ITC is granted in rem jurisdiction for any and all products imported into the
United States, which allows patent holders to bring complaints without the
potential for in personam jurisdictional concerns that apply in federal
district court. 11 Additionally, the ITC has significantly limited the time
available to the parties for discovery, thus greatly reducing the amount of
time required to reach a decision. 12
While these attributes of ITC proceedings may make for a more
appealing forum for complainants, they are also the source of much of the
criticism of the ITC and its processes. The three main criticisms of the ITC
in its Section 337 investigations are that (1) it is biased in favor of domestic
parties, (2) it is biased in favor of complainants, and (3) it provides
injunctive relief too often when a patent violation is found. This iBrief
addresses each of these three criticisms of the ITC and possible remedies to
alleviate the concerns.
¶4

I. PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN FAVOR OF DOMESTIC PARTIES IN
SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS
¶5
It is easy to see how there could be allegations of protectionist bias
within the ITC, as the Commission was founded for the explicit purpose of
protecting domestic businesses from the unfair activities of foreign firms.
The specific allegations, however, are that, in our world of increasing
globalization and the multinational organization of many corporations, the
ITC is more likely to find in favor of a domestic party than a foreign one. 13
¶6
In order for the ITC to hear a patent dispute, a domestic industry
must be harmed by the importation of the contested article. 14 This
requirement keeps the issue as one of unfair trade practices, and therefore
within the realm of the ITC, and not simply an intellectual property issue for
adjudication in district court. Originally, complaints before the ITC had to
show not only that there was a domestic producer of the subject of the
patent, but that there was economic harm done to this producer by the
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presence of the infringing import. 15 The 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act (1988 Omnibus Act) 16 eliminated the requirement of
showing economic harm and loosened the domestic-industry requirement.17
Currently, the domestic-industry requirement will be satisfied by
employment of labor or capital or investment in equipment, research,
development, or licensing. 18 This less restrictive requirement for the
domestic industry actually makes it easier for foreign firms to bring
complaints before the ITC.
¶7
There have been several attempts to empirically determine the
presence of a protectionist bias in ITC proceedings. 19 An article by Colleen
Chien studied the nationality of the parties in 219 cases brought before the
ITC. In her analysis, Chien found that the investigation was initiated by
solely domestic complainants in seventy-nine percent of cases, whereas
solely foreign complainants were present in only fifteen percent of cases
before the ITC. 20 Although this is a wide gulf between the number of cases
heard arising from domestic and foreign complaints, the difference is even
greater in cases before the district courts, as eighty-seven percent of federal
patent cases are brought by domestic plaintiffs and only thirteen percent are
brought by foreign plaintiffs. 21 Additionally, Chien determined that a vast
majority of litigation before the ITC had at least one named domestic
respondent. 22 The conclusion Chien reaches from this analysis is that there
is not an institutional bias at the ITC either for domestic complainants or
against foreign respondents and that the current state of globalization
actually very much blurs the line between the two. 23

Although this information shows that the ITC is certainly willing to
investigate the claims brought by foreign parties at least as often as its
district court counterparts, the nationalities of the parties bringing
complaints are not enough to determine if there is in fact bias in the ITC’s
decision-making process. In a study of four hundred sixty-seven Section
337 investigations, Robert Hahn and Hal Singer discovered that the highest
win rate for complainants were for cases involving a domestic complainant
and a foreign respondent. The ITC found a violation in twenty-five percent
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of cases with a domestic complainant and foreign respondent as opposed to
zero percent of cases with a foreign complainant and domestic respondent.24
¶9
This information would seem to indicate a substantial bias within
the ITC against foreign parties and in favor of domestic ones. Hahn and
Singer indicate the possibility that the apparent bias in favor of domestic
parties may be due to the more political nature of the ITC than federal
district courts. 25 This is shown by the higher win rates for domestic
complainants than foreign complainants against foreign respondents. To
create a proper context for these results, the authors compared these win
rates to those of patent cases in federal courts and found that there is a
similar disparity in federal cases tried before juries but not in those tried
before judges. 26 This would seem to indicate the presence of political
pressures on the ITC, which are not felt by district court judges. The
troubling pressure on the ITC can be created by Congress’s control over its
staffing budget, while federal judges are immune from this influence due to
life tenure and wage protection. 27 Although the authors do not expand upon
the possibility of Congressional control being the cause of a pro-domesticbusiness bias at the ITC, the statistical evidence presented certainly raises
important concerns which are not addressed by Chien’s analysis, which
found no bias.
¶10
An attempt to synthesize the two conflicting conclusions generated
by these analyses requires some understanding of the ITC’s role in modern
international trade. Although the ITC is willing to investigate complaints
made by foreign parties, the purpose of this administrative agency is not to
act as a court of law and protect all domestic patents, but rather to protect
domestic businesses and consumers. An institutional bias in the ITC in
favor of domestic parties is not surprising, but also is not as serious a
concern as it could be. This is because the ITC is not the only available
avenue for a remedy. A foreign plaintiff should not have any trouble in
obtaining jurisdiction over a domestic defendant in district court and would
likely be able to avoid these issues of institutional bias.

II. PREVALENCE OF PRO-COMPLAINANT BIAS IN SECTION 337
INVESTIGATIONS
¶11
The second main criticism of Section 337 investigations performed
by the ITC is that there is an institutional bias in the ITC to find for the
complainant. 28 In order to evaluate this claim, Chien compared the success
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rates for complainants in ITC investigations which resulted in final
determinations with patent cases fully adjudicated in federal courts. 29 The
result of this analysis was that the ITC found for the complainant in fiftyeight percent of investigations whereas the district courts only found for the
plaintiff in thirty-five percent of fully adjudicated cases. 30 This initial
statistical finding could be the result of two possible forces. Either there is
some procedural difference or bias which favors complainants, or there is
selection bias resulting in only the stronger cases reaching a final
determination. In order to check for the presence of a selection bias, Chien
compared the outcomes from cases brought before the ITC with parallel
claims brought in district court. 31 The disparity in success rates almost
disappears with fifty-four percent success rate before the ITC and a fifty
percent success rate in district court. 32 Although a majority of the
complaints before the ITC have a corresponding case in district court, the
ITC litigation is more likely to reach a final determination due to the shorter
period of ITC litigation and the fact that most cases in federal court result in
settlements. This reduces the sample size for Chien’s analysis but also
provides supporting evidence that the stronger cases are litigated before the
ITC and then many are settled before the district court makes a final ruling.
¶12
Taking this analysis a step further, Hahn and Singer decided to
compare the survival rates of ITC final determinations to district court
decisions upon appeal. 33 This is a good method for testing the presence of a
bias as the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit hears the
appeals from both the ITC and the district courts regarding patent
infringement. The survival rate on appeal of ITC determinations in favor of
the respondent was seventy-four percent, while the survival rate for
determinations in favor of the complainant was only fifty-two percent. 34
Even before comparison to the data of appeals from the district courts, the
evidence indicates that there is a substantial difference in the robustness of
ITC findings for the complainant and for the respondent. The increased
likelihood of reversal on appeal is problematic if the ITC is finding for
complainants on insufficient showings of fact.
¶13
The survival rates upon appeal for patent cases argued before a
district court are between seventy-five and eighty percent regardless of the
prevailing party at the district court. 35 This is comparable to the seventyfour percent survival rate of ITC determinations in favor of respondents but
29
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even further highlights the problematic fifty-two percent survival rate for
ITC determinations in favor of the complainant. 36 There are no procedural
differences which should provide for this disparity, as the standard of
review and available evidence before the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is comparable regardless of the venue from which the appeal
originates. This gives rise to Hahn and Singer’s claim that there is an
unexplained bias in favor of complainants at the ITC. 37
¶14
The story is similar when comparing the results in parallel cases
before the ITC and district courts. Rather than comparing the total number
of findings for the complainant in each venue, Hahn and Singer compared
the number of times the decision of the district court agreed with the finding
in the ITC proceeding. 38 Although the sample size is admittedly small,
there is a slightly higher rate of agreement by the district court when the
ITC finds for the respondent as opposed to the complainant. 39
¶15
The difference in outcomes before the ITC and the district court
could have several explanations. First, there is a substantial selection bias
in the cases brought before the ITC. If the stronger cases are brought before
the ITC as opposed to the district court, then the observed difference in
successful claims would be perfectly normal and not problematic. The data
from both the Chien and the Hahn and Singer articles shows that the
disparity in win rates shrinks, supporting the proposition that there is at least
some selection bias in the complaints brought before the ITC.

Another factor favoring complainants is that the ITC does not allow
all defenses for respondents available in district court. In its dicta in Kinik
v. International Trade Commission, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit determined that the statutory defenses for foreign defendants in
patent cases are not always available to respondents in proceedings before
the ITC. 40 The defense specifically barred in Kinik was that the foreign
producer had substantially altered the product of the patented process
through a subsequent process. Congress created a statutory defense in
process patent cases in federal court for such subsequent alterations in the
1988 Omnibus Act. 41 The court in Kinik held that the statutory construction
of this defense prevents its use in ITC proceedings. The wording of the
Senate Report accompanying the 1988 Omnibus Act creating this statutory
defense states that there is no “intention for these provisions to limit in
any way the ability of process patent owners to obtain relief from the U.S.
¶16
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International Trade Commission.” 42 Relying on this language, the Kinik
court limited the scope of the statutory defense to cases originating before a
federal district court. 43 This limitation, however, seems to be in direct
contrast with the statute granting authority to the ITC to hear patent cases,
which states that respondents may bring “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses”
in ITC proceedings.44 This apparent inconsistency has been brought to light
by several commentators in their critiques of ITC proceedings. 45
¶17
Selection bias and different applicable defenses appear to have
some effect on the success rates for ITC complainants, yet they should not
have an appreciable effect on the survival rate of ITC decisions upon
appeal. Thus, the data gathered by Hahn and Singer seems to be the most
damning evidence of an appreciable bias throughout the ITC to favor
complainants. The limited forms of remedies available to the ITC when
infringement is found compounds this problem and leads to the most serious
critique of ITC Section 337 investigations.

III. THE ITC PROMOTES HOLD-UP BY PROVIDING INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF WHEN IT IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FOR THE
INFRINGEMENT
¶18
Unlike the allegations of bias in ITC proceedings, the third main
criticism deals with the nature of the laws governing ITC proceedings
themselves, rather than the unfair or unequal application of those laws.
Several commentators have argued that the prevalence of injunctive relief as
the remedy in ITC proceedings leads to a scenario known as “patent holdup,” resulting in inefficiency in the production of goods and in negotiations
between patent holders and producers. 46 The potential economic harm to
society from such forms of patent hold-up is two-fold. First, a permanent
injunction on the importation of an already designed and marketed good
may force domestic consumers to incur significant costs by shifting to an
inferior substitute. 47 Second, the producer itself will have to spend time and
money duplicating its original research and development processes for the
product in order to discover a non-infringing design, resulting in higher
prices to the final consumer. 48 The limitation on remedies available to the
42
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ITC after finding patent infringement stems from the statutory authority
allowing it to hear Section 337 violations. 49
¶19
It is not surprising that the ITC has been found to grant injunctive
relief far more often than district courts, because the ITC lacks statutory
authority to award monetary damages and reasonable royalties. Chien
compared the success rate of claimants seeking injunctions in ITC
proceedings with that of successful plaintiffs in patent cases in district
courts who specifically requested injunctive relief. 50 She found that
injunctive relief was granted by the ITC in one hundred percent of cases,
while the district courts issued an injunction in seventy-nine percent of
cases. 51 Although the district courts were more likely than not to provide
injunctive relief for a successful plaintiff requesting it, injunctions were
guaranteed for successful complainants before the ITC. By using the
district court rate of issuing injunctive relief as a benchmark, this raw
empirical data would seem to suggest that there are at least several instances
where the ITC issues an exclusion order when another form of remedy
would have been more efficient or would have better served the parties
involved. Chien’s data is also limited to district court cases which reached a
final verdict and the plaintiff requested injunctive relief. By limiting the
number of district court cases to only those with the highest likelihood of
injunctive relief, the difference in rates between the ITC and district courts
is even more compelling.
¶20
Using a larger sample set, Hahn and Singer found that the ITC
issued injunctive relief in ninety-six percent of proceedings in which it
issued a remedy as opposed to twenty-nine percent of patent cases where
the district court found infringement. 52 This data includes all patent
infringement cases from a three-year period and is not limited to those
explicitly requesting injunctive relief. Hahn and Singer argue that although
the instance of injunctive relief in district court was relatively low, it can be
expected to decrease in the future after the holding in eBay Inc. v.
Mercexchange. 53 In eBay, 54 the Supreme Court ruled that the traditional
four-part test which must be satisfied before a federal court can generally
issue an injunction applies to patent cases as well. 55 The purpose of this test
is to ensure that the district courts take full account of the public-interest

49
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factors which would be harmed by a permanent injunction.56 Although this
decision is designed to limit the availability of injunctive relief to plaintiffs
in district court, it will not have any direct effect on the remedies available
in ITC proceedings.
¶21
Hahn and Singer specifically describe two scenarios where the ITC
is likely (if not certain) to issue a permanent injunction in terms of an
exclusion order, which would likely to meet the eBay test for federal patent
cases:

1. when the excluded product contains many complex
and patented components of which the allegedly
infringed patent only covers one small component, and
2. when the patent holder is a non-practicing entity
(NPE). 57
Both of these scenarios are likely to result in patent hold-up and arguably
higher-than-optimal royalty rates to patent holders.
¶22
The first scenario covers situations where industrial defendants
have invested significant amounts of time and money in the research and
development of a particular product which is threatened with the chance of
being excluded from importation into the United States due to the inclusion
of a small infringing component. An injunction, or even the threat of an
injunction, would likely cause the producer to incur immense further costs
in the redesign of the product to not include the infringing element. When
this is the case, the patent holder will be able to use this threat to extract a
higher royalty from the producer than the relative worth of the component
to the whole. 58 Through the use of an economic model, Lemley and
Shapiro argue that this higher royalty rate is above the optimally efficient
level. 59 Although other commentators have altered their model in order to
show that these negotiated royalties are not above optimal levels, 60 the main
proposition is strong: that patent holders will be more likely to negotiate a
higher royalty once the producer has incurred great design expense and is
facing a credible threat of an immediate, permanent injunction. Mitigating
this particular criticism, the ITC has its own balancing test, consisting of
nine independent factors (EPROMs factors) distinct from that set forth in
eBay, to consider when determining the application and scope of an
exclusion order regarding products which incorporate a patented component

56
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(downstream products). 61 The definition of downstream products, however,
does not include all those products indicated by Hahn and Singer in this
scenario. A product incorporating many different patents would be, for
example, a microchip, while the downstream product would be any
computer, phone, or PDA including that particular chip. Thus, although the
EPROMs factors are designed to reduce the problem of patent hold-up, they
are not sufficient to eliminate the increased likelihood of an injunctive
remedy imposed by the ITC under this scenario.
¶23
The second scenario, a complaint brought by an NPE, is not
specifically addressed by the rules or procedures of the ITC. One possible
explanation for this is that, in their investigations, Hahn and Singer did not
find a single exclusion order issued by the ITC between 1990 and 2000 for
which the plaintiff satisfied this condition. 62 Although there were no
exclusion orders found meeting these criteria, there were four cases before
the ITC which resulted in settlements where the complainant was likely an
NPE. 63 That the proceeding resulted in a settlement is evidence that the
threat of an injunction from an ITC proceeding may be more effective than
in district court due to the inapplicability of the eBay ruling. Although NPE
complainants have not been a significant contributor to ITC proceedings in
the past, there is no reason to believe that non-producing patent holders will
not threaten to bring a complaint before the ITC as a tactic in licensing
negotiations. Originally, the requirement of showing economic harm to a
developed domestic industry would have precluded NPE complainants from
requesting ITC investigations. However, the combination of stricter
requirements for injunctions in district courts after eBay with lessened
restrictions of the domestic-industry requirement after the 1988 Omnibus
Act 64 could potentially lead to an increase in proceedings in the ITC
initiated by NPEs.

IV. POTENTIAL REFORMS OF THE ITC
The biases in ITC proceedings favoring both domestic firms and
complainants are not likely to be properly addressed through the legal
system. These problems are predominantly internal issues within the ITC
¶24
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which can only be changed by bringing them to light or appointing new
commissioners. One significant exception to this is the limitation of
defenses available to ITC respondents after Kinik. The holding of Kinik
should be overturned to afford respondents “[a]ll legal and equitable
defenses” as required by statute. 65 The remainder of this section is devoted
to procedural and legal reforms of the ITC designed to reduce the problem
of patent hold-up.

A. Increase the remedies available to the ITC once an infringement is
found.
¶25
One of the commonly discussed reforms of the ITC involves
increasing the statutorily available remedies for patent infringement. 66 By
allowing for monetary damages or reasonable royalties, the ITC would have
greater discretion in deciding what remedy to implement and could better
fashion the remedy to the specific situation. By putting more tools in the
toolbox, the ITC is more likely to pick the best one for the application.
Allowing the ITC to issue other forms of relief would have the result of
decreasing the effect of patent hold-up by reducing the likelihood of an
exclusion order against a producer when the infringing article is only a
small element of the finished product. Although the infringing party will
not avoid any damages, those imposed will be less severe and not as
extortionate as would be likely under the threat of injunction.

This reform has serious problems, however. First and foremost,
this would create substantial redundancies with patent cases in federal
district court. If both of the venues offer the same remedies for the same
violations, there would be no necessity to have both. A greater problem
than the lack of efficiency would be the absence of res judicata for ITC
decisions on district court decisions. 67 Although there are current problems
with inconsistent decisions between the two venues, this problem is only
likely to be exacerbated by increasing the remedies available to ITC
complainants. Right now, only those seeking injunctive relief will file
complaints with the ITC, but if monetary relief is also attainable, then there
will likely be an increase in the number of claims filed both before the ITC
and in district court. Currently, ITC proceedings are neither final nor
binding in parallel district court litigation. Many district courts will stay
their proceedings to allow the ITC to reach its determination, but the district
courts may decide what level of persuasive value to give the ITC
¶26
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determinations on a case-by-case basis. 68 By increasing the remedies which
the ITC may impose, this reform would have the general effect of
increasing the number of parallel proceedings in the ITC and the district
courts. This increase in duplicate adjudication will most likely lead to more
confusing and conflicting decisions in the two venues, while still giving no
finality to the determinations of the ITC.

B. Reduce the scope of ITC Section 337 investigations to those
outside federal jurisdiction.
¶27
The concerns raised by expanding the remedies available to the ITC
can be significantly eliminated by moving in the opposite direction and
drastically limiting the authority of the ITC to conduct Section 337
investigations. By restricting the jurisdiction of the ITC solely to those
items imported into the United States which would otherwise escape federal
court jurisdiction would eliminate the redundancies and potential for
conflicting judgments.

In almost every case, the remedies available to a complainant in
ITC proceedings are also available through the federal courts. 69 So long as
there is federal jurisdiction over the defendant, the federal courts, based on
the data considered in this iBrief, would be the proper venue for litigation
and the determination of remedies. Chien disparages this approach because
reducing the scope of the ITC’s Section 337 proceedings to only those
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts would drastically reduce the
number of “rapid resolution[s]” available to complainants. 70 Based on the
apparent prevalence of bias both in favor of complainants and domestic
parties, perhaps such a rapid resolution to the investigation is not the benefit
it would appear to be. Hahn and Singer support this type of reform due to
its economic efficiency. 71 By granting exclusive jurisdiction to the district
courts for patent infringement cases in which there is federal jurisdiction,
the government would be able to conserve resources by eliminating
duplicative adjudication while simultaneously eliminating the economic
harm to consumers from patent hold-up generated by the ITC’s perceived
improperly high rate of issuing exclusion orders.
¶28

¶29
This style of reform, although attractive on the surface, would
require an act of Congress to substantially reduce the scope of Section 337
investigations. Additionally, the ITC does serve an important purpose as an
administrative body regulating the importation of goods into the United
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Chien, supra note 10, at 104 (quoting Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress
Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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Chien, supra note 10, at 103.
70
Id. at 106.
71
Hahn & Singer, supra note 11, at 488.
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States. Were the ITC simply a parallel court of law, then the overlaps with
the district courts would be very difficult to defend. The ITC is not, nor
does it purport to be, a court of law, but rather a part of the Executive
Branch of the government designed to robustly defend domestic industry
and intellectual property rights. Despite the current risk of expensive patent
hold-up, this form of drastic reduction in the effectiveness of ITC
investigations would be very difficult to support.

C. Require the ITC to utilize the four-part eBay test prior to issuing
injunctive relief.
¶30
Regardless of any other changes to the form or procedural law of
the ITC, a change should certainly be made to the substantive law
governing the issuance of exclusion orders: the ITC should be bound by the
standard for injunctive relief applied to the federal district courts after the
decision in eBay. This reform could be applied regardless of any changes to
the range of remedies available to the ITC or the scope of Section 337
investigations. In either situation, the stricter standard for imposing an
exclusion order would eliminate many of the claims that the ITC is the
source of significant patent hold-up. In the district courts, the newly
imposed eBay test for patent litigation has resulted in injunctive relief being
denied for NPEs who were seeking injunctions primarily for an advantage
in royalty negotiations. 72 This would expand the efficiency and publicharm analysis to all exclusion orders and not only those affecting
downstream products which are currently subject to the EPROMs factors.
¶31
This reform may also be implemented without any Congressional
action. 73 The Supreme Court did not impose this test upon proceedings
before the ITC, but neither did the Court explicitly preclude the ITC from
adopting it. 74 This method of action would require no explicit changes in
the structure or effectiveness of the ITC, but would rather serve to reduce
the number of arguably improper exclusion orders issued for patent holders.
If an infringement is found, yet an injunction would not satisfy this more
restrictive test, then the ITC could either issue a stay so that an exclusion
order would not be enforced for a period allowing the infringer to redesign
the product, or it could simply state that there was an infringement, and the
proper recourse would be a suit in federal district court. Monetary damages
and reasonable royalties are still available and certainly not precluded by
any determination of the ITC, and further careful review prior to the
issuance of a permanent injunction would serve the interests of the public
and therefore those of the ITC itself.
72
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CONCLUSION
¶32
The data gathered by different sources can either support or
contradict allegations of bias in proceedings before the ITC depending on
interpretation. The main point of agreement among scholars is that the ITC
is more likely to issue injunctive relief upon the finding of infringement
than district courts in similar patent proceedings. By accepting the
assumption that the district courts operate properly and issue injunctive
relief only when it is warranted, this disparity in the use of injunctive relief
gives credibility to the claims of economic harm due to patent hold-up.
¶33
Proposed reform of the ITC spans a wide range of options, from
drastically increasing the power and available remedies to severely limiting
the Commission’s Section 337 jurisdiction. These options would
substantially undermine the relevance of the ITC or, alternatively, create
additional redundancies with district court litigation. The best course of
action requires a more subtle change. By simply following the eBay test for
injunctive relief, the ITC could significantly reduce the likelihood of patent
holdup. The effects of this slight reform would be even more potent if the
holding of Kinik were overturned, allowing respondents in ITC proceedings
the full range of defenses available in the district courts. Both of these
reforms could be achieved through either legislation or judicial precedent,
and would ensure the ITC remains both relevant and requisite.

